Adam Smith on Competitive Religious Markets: Preaching about Preachers? by Leathers, Charles G. & Raines, J. Patrick
University of Richmond 
UR Scholarship Repository 
Robins School of Business White Paper Series, 
1980-2011 Robins School of Business 
1990 
Adam Smith on Competitive Religious Markets: Preaching about 
Preachers? 
Charles G. Leathers 
J. Patrick Raines 
University of Richmond 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/robins-white-papers 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leathers, Charles G. and J. Patrick Raines. 1990. "Adam Smith on Competitive Religious Markets: 
Preaching about Preachers?" E.C.R.S.B. 90-3. Robins School of Business White Paper Series. University of 
Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
This White Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Robins School of Business at UR Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Robins School of Business White Paper Series, 1980-2011 by an 
authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
ADAM SMITH ON COMPETITIVE RELIGIOUS MARKETS: 
PREACHING ABOUT PREACHERS? 
Charles G. Lea t hers 
J . Pa tric k Rai nes 
1990 - 3 
ADAM SMITH ON COMPETITIVE RELIGIOUS MARKETS: 
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Charles G. Leathers 
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I. Introduction 
J. Patrick Raines 
University of Richmond 
Richmond, Virginia 
Anderson (1988) and Rosenberg (1960) have provided 
substantial insights into Adam Smith's economic analysis of 
religious behavior. In particular, both emphasized smith's 
optimistic view of competitive religious markets. As an 
addendum, this paper investigates more closely the 
theoretical basis for Smith's prediction that optimal 
religious doctrine and institutions would spontaneously 
evolve in free markets for preachers. 
Anderson argued that while Stigler (1982) correctly 
noted Smith's episodes of economic "preaching," Smith 
deserves credit for his "bold extension of economic analysis 
into an area of human behavior traditionally thought to be 
beyond the boundaries of economic science: religion" 
(Anderson 1988, p. 1067). Yet, in predicting optimal 
outcomes in competitive religious markets Smith may have 
been "preaching" about preachers. More specifically, Smith 
failed to offer a viable theory of efficient competitive 
markets for preachers as a basis for such a prediction. 
Our purpose is to explain the nature of that failure. 
We draw from Rosenberg's article Smith's principle of 
optimal rewards and show that optimality in the structure of 
clerical incomes is a necessary condition for the predicted 
optimal religious doctrine and institutions. Subsequently, 
we note Smith's conception of optimal clerical incomes, and 
find that his theoretical framework was not sufficiently 
specified to predict optimal outcomes when clerical incomes 
are derived from voluntary contributions. The deficiency 
lies in the absence of an institutional mechanism that would 
guide clerical incomes to optimal levels. 
II. Smith's Principle of Optimal Rewards 
Smith described religious instruction (or "instruction 
of people of all ages") as "a species of instruction of 
which the object is not so much to render the people good 
citizens of this world, as to prepare them for another and 
better world to come" (1937, p. 740). Nonetheless, his 
economic analysis of religious instruction revealed 
significant influence on behavior of individuals in this 
world, e.g.: "Smith noted that one of the most economically 
significant functions of religious belief was to provide 
strong incentives to follow moral strictures that helped to 
support civil society, that is, honesty, benevolence, 
restraint from violence, and so forth" (Anderson 1988, p. 
1069). 
In the case of religious behavior, Smith's "economic 
imperialism" (Anderson 1988, p. 1067) manifested from his 
interest in the alternative methods by which institutions 
for religious instruction could be financed. The use of 
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public revenues could be justified on an economic basis. 
But private funding by voluntary contributions, which would 
keep alive the "powerful motive of self-interest," had 
greater merit. 
The expence of the institutions for education 
and religious instruction, is .•. , no doubt, 
beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore 
be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole 
society. This expence, however, might perhaps with 
equal propriety, and even with some advantage, be 
defrayed altogether by those who received the 
immediate benefit of such education or instruction, or 
by the voluntary contributions of those who think they 
have occasion for either the one or the other 
(Smith 1937, p. 768) 
Smith was highly optimistic about the social benefits 
of free competition in markets for preaching, with 
government maintaining a strictly laissez faire policy 
toward all religious sects. Rather than encouraging 
religious fanaticism, intolerance, and exploitation of a 
credulous public, "free markets in preaching tended to 
generate socially efficient doctrine" (Anderson 1988, p. 
1073) and "to provide optimal religious institutions" 
(Anderson 1988, p. 1078). 
In essence, Smith envisioned a long-run equilibrium in 
competitive religious "markets." He predicted that small 
independent sects would emerge, similar in several respects 
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to the small firms in perfectly competitive formal markets. 
No single sect "could be considerable enough to disturb the 
public tranquility," and "the success of no one teacher, or 
sect of teachers, . could ever be very great" (Smith 1937, pp. 
744-745). Religious competition would take the impersonal 
form characteristic of perfectly competitive markets. Each 
religious instructor, being virtually alone, would be forced 
to adopt a tolerant attitude of "live and let live" toward 
other sects. 
Smith also predicted that the doctrines of all 
religious sects might be reduced to a "pure and rational 
religion, free of every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or 
fanaticism, 11 reflecting "the most philos ·ophical good temper 
and moderation" (1937, p. 745). That convergence of 
religious doctrines in a "pure and rational religion" 
suggests the homogeneity of outputs in perfectly competitive 
markets. 
Anderson (1988} explained why the type of religious 
doctrine and institutions that Smith predicted would emerge 
spontaneously under "free markets in preaching" would be 
socially optimal (p. 1073 and p. 1078). 
"Pure and rational religion ••. 11 is optimal 
in the sense that it is most consistent with the 
efficient operation of the economic system, because 
it tends to produce changes in individuals that 
facilitate their participation in the contractual 
order of the market economy. "Philosophical good 
temper and moderation" are necessary prerequisites 
for the peaceful functioning of the division of 
labor; "the grossest delusions of superstition" 
••• are inconsistent with the rapid progress in 
pure and applied science (Anderson 1988, p. 1074). 
Anderson's investigation of the allocative efficiency 
implications of Smith's theory of competitive religious 
markets strongly complemented Rosenberg's earlier article 
(1960), which called attention to smith's concept of optimal 
clerical incomes. Rosenberg dealt generally with Smith's 
interest in identifying institutional arrangements that 
would induce optimal intensity of effort on part of the 
human agents in the production processes while 
simultaneously guiding those efforts in socially optimal 
directions (pp. 559-560). Smith's view of individuals as 
driven by -self-interest in a "constant, uniform and 
uninterrupted effort" to improve their own conditions is 
routinely noted in secondary literature. But Rosenberg 
observed that Smith also perceived individuals as being 
prone to slothfulness, indolence, and self-indulgence, 
"naturally deceitful and unscrupulous," tending to use "bad" 
rather than "good" instruments unless otherwise restrained 
by institutional structures (Rosenberg 1960, pp. 557-558). 
The Smithian key to optimal productive efforts by the 
human agents is an institutional order that assures optimal 
incomes. 
The ideal institutional order for Smith is one 
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which places the individual under just the proper 
amount of psychic tension. The individual applies 
himself with maximum industry and efficiency when 
the reward for effort is neither too low (slaves, 
apprentices) nor too great (monopolists, landowners) 
(Rosenberg 1960, p. 559). 
Given the appropriate set of institutions, " •• the 
conflicting forces which motivate men to act really 
establish an optimal income in all economic activities" 
(Rosenberg 1960, p. 558). 
Smith's criterion for income optimality may be referred 
to as his principle of optimal rewards. A generalized 
expression of that principle appears in THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS: 
• Every virtue naturally meets with its 
proper reward, with recompense which is most fit 
to encourage and promote it; and this too so 
surely, that it requires a very extra-ordinary 
concurrence of circumstances entirely to 
disappoint it (Smith 1966, p. 236). 
The most explicit statement and application of the 
principle, however, appear in WEALTH OF NATIONS in the 
section on financing religious instruction: 
The proper performance of every service seems 
to require that its pay or recompense should be, 
as exactly as possible, proportioned to the 
nature of the service. If any service is very 
much under-paid, it is very apt to suffer from 
the meanness and incapacity of the greater part 
of those who are employed in it. If it is very 
much over-paid, it is apt to suffer, perhaps, 
still more by their negligence and idleness 
(Smith 1937, p. 766). 
Smith's evaluation of the relative merits of private 
versus public funding of religious instruction was guided by 
his own interpretation of how the principle of optimal 
rewards applied in the case of clergymen. That optimal 
incomes for religious instructors is required for long-run 
equilibrium in competitive religious "markets" is clearly 
indicated by Smith's declaration that: "Each (religious) 
teacher would no doubt find himself under the necessity of 
making the utmost exertion, and using every art to both 
preserve and to increase the number of his disciples" (Smith 
1937, pp. 744-745). In Smithian theory, clergymen could be 
expected to make the "utmost exertion" only if their incomes 
were at optimal levels. 
III. Optimal Clerical Incomes 
Smith's prediction of optimal outcomes in competitive 
religious markets rested on an expectation that (l)financial 
dependency upon voluntary contributions would somehow result 
in optimal clerical incomes, thus assuring optimal intensity 
of effort by religious instructors, and {2)the disciplinary 
forces of competition among the numerous small sects would 
direct clerical efforts in a socially optimal direction. 
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But for a theory that validates such an expectation, Smith 
needed to (l)define optimality with respect to clerical 
incomes, and (2)identify an institutional mechanism that 
would tend to optimize clerical incomes derived from 
voluntary contributions toward optimal levels. 
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smith revealed the characteristics of optimal clerical 
incomes in reference to the established presbyterian 
churches in Scotland, Holland, and Switzerland. In contrast 
to his negative assessment of the behavior of the 
established clergy of the more affluent churches of Rome and 
England, Smith was rather profuse in his praise of the 
behavior of the presbyterian clergy. In all the 
presbyterian churches where the rights of patronage were 
thoroughly established, the clergy generally endeavored to 
gain the favor of their superiors by "nobler and better 
arts," by .their learning, the irreproachable regularity of 
their life-styles, and the faithful and diligent discharge 
of their duties. Indeed, Europe was unable to present a 
more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of 
men (Smith 1937, p. 762). 
The factor responsible for the presbyterian success was 
the sizes of the benefices accorded the clergymen. 
Smith seems to feel that the mode of payment 
devised by the Presbyterian clergy struck just 
that optimal balance between underpayment, which 
drove the mendicant orders to that excessive and 
misplaced zeal which Smith likened to a plundering 
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army and overpayment from large independent endow-
ments, which was so often responsible for indolence, 
negligence, and 'contemptuous and arrogant airs' 
(Rosenberg 1960, p. 568). 
In comparison to the benefices of the churches of Rome 
and Engiand, the presbyterian benefices were small and 
relatively equal. But those characteristics proved 
virtually ideal. Differentials between benefices were not 
sufficiently large to tempt even the recipient of the 
smallest to resort to the "vile arts of flattery and 
assentation" in an effort to secure a better appointment 
from his patron. Smith was quite explicit in specifying 
that optimal clerical incomes must be relatively small: 
A man of large revenue, whatever may be his 
profession, thinks he ought to live like other 
men of large revenues; and to spend a great deal 
of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissi-
pation. But in a clergymen this train of life not 
only consumes the time which ought to be employed 
in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of 
the common people destroys almost entirely that 
sanctity of character which can alone enable him 
to perform those duties with proper weight and 
authority (1937, p. 766). 
Smith described at some length the advantages of a 
structure of clerical incomes exemplified by the 
presbyterian churches: 
Where the church benefices are nearly all equal, 
none of them can be very great, and this mediocrity 
of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too 
far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. 
Nothing but the most exemplary morals can give 
dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of 
levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous, 
and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they 
are to the common people. In his own conduct, there-
fore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals 
which the common people respect the most. He gains 
their esteem and affection by that plan of life which 
his own interest and situation would lead him to 
follow. The common people look upon him with that 
kindness with which we naturally regard one who 
approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, 
we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness 
naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful 
to instruct them, and attentive to assist and relieve 
them. He does not even despise the prejudices of 
people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, 
and never treats them with those contemptuous and 
arrogant airs which we so often meet with in the 
proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed 
churches. The presbyterian clergy, accordingly, 
have more influence over the minds of the common 
people than perhaps the clergy of any other 
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established church (Smith 1937, p. 762). 
Possibly it might be argued that Smith was merely 
comparing established churches, and found the presbyterian 
churches preferable to the churches of Rome and England. 
The most opulent church in Christendom does 
not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the 
fervor of devotion, the spirit of order, regular-
ity, and austere morals in the great body of the 
people than this very poorly endowed church of 
Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and 
religious, which an established church can be 
supposed to produce, are produced by it as 
completely as by any other (1937, p. 765). 
Such an i nterpretation, however, misses the critical point 
in Smith's economic analysis of religious instruction. As 
Anderson (1988) explained, Smith perceived social merit in 
the maintenance of "the uniformity of faith, the fervor of 
devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere 
morals in the great body of the people." 
In fact, the outcomes achieved by the established 
presbyterian churches were strikingly similar to those 
predicted by Smith to emerge under conditions of free 
competition. Not only were the presbyterian clergy 
maximizing effort, but the doctrines were universally 
appealing, suggesting the pure and rational doctrine that 
Smith predicted in a competitive religious "market." 
It is accordingly in presbyterian countries 
only that we ever find the common people converted, 
without persecution, completely, and almost to a 
man, to the established church (Smith 1937, p. 762). 
Even the swiss laws requiring memberships in the 
established presbyterian churches, with non-members being 
obliged to leave the canton, reflected a lack of coercion 
necessary to retain members of those sects. 
In the great part of the protestant cantons, there 
is not a single person to be found who does not 
profess himself to be of the established church. 
If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, 
the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so 
severe, or rather indeed so oppressive a law, 
could never have been executed in such free 
countries, had not the diligence of the clergy 
before-hand converted to the established church 
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the whole body of the people, with the exception of, 
perhaps, a few individuals only (1937, pp. 765-766 
III. Income Optimality in Competitive Religious -Markets' 
Given Smith's conception of optimality in clerical 
incomes, his prediction of optimal institutions and doctrine 
ultimately rests on the presumption of an institutional 
mechanism in competitive religious "markets" which assures 
each clergyman an income optimally small and equal to 
incomes of all other clergymen. In formal markets for 
private goods, clerical incomes would be based on 
prices/wages established by supply and demand (i.e., prices 
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if clergymen are regarded as proprietors of the firms; wages 
if they are regarded as employees of the religious "firm.") 
But religious instruction provided through preaching is 
essentially a highly localized public good, and its 
financing by voluntary contribution is subject to the free 
rider problem. Smith's theory of free markets for preaching 
not only must explain why voluntary contributions will be 
forthcoming, but also why contributions to each independent 
sect would be exactly sufficient to assure optimal clerical 
incomes. 
It can easily be argued that Smith's theory does meet 
the first requirement. Anderson (1988) noted that two 
monitoring mechanisms can be observed in Smith's economic 
analysis of religious instruction which would tend to 
discourage free rider inclinations on part of members of 
religious ·sects. One of those mechanisms involved external 
monitoring of individual members' activities by other 
members of the same sect. 
smith emphasizes that these 'small religious 
sects' are voluntary associations, whose chief 
form of sanction of their members is expulsion. 
He portrays these small sects as clubs that require 
their members to adhere to strict rules. These 
clubs serve to signal the upstanding moral 
character, trustworthiness, and honesty of their 
members and control free-riding by close monitoring 
of members' behavior (Anderson 1988, p. 1072) 
In sufficiently small groups, external monitoring would 
induce members to make financial contributions. Failures to 
do so could be easily known and precipitate disciplinary 
actions, ranging from subtle peer pressure to the extreme of 
expulsion from membership in the sect. 
In addition, Anderson (1988) noted that in THE THEORY 
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, Smith described belief in God as 
constituting a kind of internal moral enforcement mechanism, 
as indicated in the following statements. 
The sense of propriety too is here well supported 
by the strongest motives of self-interest. The 
idea that, however we may escape the observa-
tion of man, or be placed abbve the reach of human 
punishment, yet we are always acting under the 
eye, and exposed to the punishment of God, the great 
avenger of injustice, is a motive capable of 
constraining the most headstrong passions, with 
those who, by constant reflection, have rendered it 
familiar to them (Smith 1966, p. 241). 
Elsewhere in THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, Smith speaks 
of the "all seeing Judge of the world whose eye can never be 
deceived and whose judgement can never be perverted" (Smith 
1966, p. 187). As Anderson (1988) noted, this "Judge" is 
expected to reward virtue and punish vice, even if neither 
is recognized by fellow mortals (p. 1069). 
This internal monitoring mechanism is of particular 
importance for the private financing of religious 
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instruction through voluntary contributions. Devout members 
of religious sects will tend to make financial contributions 
out of a sense of moral duty. Friedman (1986) explained the 
economics of this phenomenon in terms of religious radio 
programming, where the influence of external monitoring 
would be entirely absent. 
If, as many radio preachers claim, donating money 
to their programs is a virtuous act, then the 
program is no longer, for those listeners, a pure 
public good. The preacher may not know which 
listeners help pay for the show and which do not, 
but God knows. one of the benefits produced by the 
program is an increased chance of a heavenly reward; 
you are more likely to get that benefit if you pay 
for it. Thus religion provides a solution to the 
public-good problem (Friedman 1986, p. 427). 
The two monitoring mechanisms discernible in Smith's 
theory only serve to encourage financial contributions from 
individuals who either stand to gain reputation (investment 
in human capital) from membership in the particular 
religious sect or are devout believers. Neither mechanism 
provides a counterpart to the competitive bidding processes 
in formal labor markets that push wages in Smith's theory 
toward "natural" rates. Moreover, neither monitoring 
mechanism would cause clerical incomes across all the many 
small independent religious sects to stabilize at optimally 
small and equal levels. 
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For any particular sect, total contributions would be a 
function of the number of members and the amount contributed 
per member. Smith's expectations of relatively small 
memberships in religious sects under a policy of laissez 
faire was no doubt realistic for the 18th century in view of 
the primitive state of communications and transportation. 
But even if all churches were of similar size in terms of 
memberships, substantial differences in contributions would 
be expected for two reasons: (l)economic ability to 
contribute varies substantially from community to community, 
and among groups within any given community; and (2) 
individuals' willingness to contribute would be heavily 
influenced by the proficiencies of clergymen in the arts of 
proselytization. 
Smith's expectation of optimal clerical incomes in free 
markets for preachers would be valid if congregations of all 
small religious sects were equally affluent and all 
religious instructors were equally proficient in the "arts 
of popularity and of gaining proselytes" (1937, p. 757). 
But Smith was keenly aware that such equalities did not 
exist. In his discussion of religious instructions in 
WEALTH OF NATIONS, he explicitly recognized economic class 
differences, noting not only clerymen's tendencies to 
emulate the affluent classes if their benefices were too 
high, but also that different sets of morals appealed to 
different income groups (1937, pp. 746-747). In addition, 
he explicitly commented on the differing degrees of skills 
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and talents in the art of proselytization among the various 
clergymen (1937, p.741 and p. 757). These difference into 
question not only his expectation of optimal clerical 
incomes in competitive religious "markets," but also his 
expectation of the emergence of a "pure and rational" 
religious doctrine. 
Clergymen who are exceptionally proficient in the art 
of proselytization and hold appointments in churches with 
affluent members may successfully solicit substantial 
contributions with relatively little effort. Moreover, 
since the morals ~f the more affl~ent groups tended 
(according to Smith) to be more lax than those of the less 
affluent groups, these same clergymen would not be expected 
to direct their efforts toward maintaining the devoutness, 
regularity of conduct, and sober behavior that Smith found 
so commendable on part of the presbyterian clergymen. 
Instead, the clergymen of the affluent congregations may be 
able to gain even greater contributions by alleviating any 
sense of guilt · on part of contributors over their looser 
morals and . frivolous conduct. 
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In contrast, many clergy with less affluent 
congregations may be unable to induce contributions 
sufficient for optimal incomes even if they maximize their 
efforts. Moreover, clergymen who are less proficient in the 
arts of proselytization may be inclined to resort to 
fanaticism and hostility toward other sects (especially more 
affluent sects) in efforts to increase the intensity of 
emotions of their followers, and hence, to persuade those 
followers to contributed more substantially. Thus, the 
negative aspects of religious competition which both Smith 
and Hume feared could not be predicted to disappear. 
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From a modern perspective, the rather common practice 
of intra-denominational transfers from affluent churches to 
less affluent churches contributes to some degree toward a 
leveling of clerical incomes. But smith's theory can not 
predict the spontaneous emergence of intra-denominational 
redistribution of revenues. Rather, the practice represents 
discretionary decisions by the more affluent churches, which 
may vary greatly from church to church. Indeed, the 
existence of large denominations with centralized financial 
structures tends to be at odds with Smith's prediction of 
many small independent religious sects in competitive 
religious ·"markets." 
V. Summary Statement 
our investigation of the theoretical basis for Adam 
Smith's prediction that free markets for preachers would 
lead to optimal religious institutions and doctrine can be 
summarized as follows: 
(l)Within the context of Smith's theory, optimal 
outcomes in competitive religious "markets" 
required that clergymen receive optimal incomes 
in accordance with the principle of optimal 
rewards. 
(2)Smith described the particular characteristics of 
an optimal structure of clerical incomes, although, 
paradoxically, his reference was to the established 
presbyterian churches of Scotland, Holland, and 
Switzerland. 
(J}Smith failed, however, to identify an institutional 
mechanism which would tend to establish clerical 
incomes derived from voluntary contributions at 
optimal levels, thereby leaving his theory of 
competitive religious "markets" inadequately 
specified to generate predictions of optimal 
outcomes. 
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